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Summary  findings
The 1990s have seen renewed interest in themes of  disequilibria  or both. And encouraging  private saving
economic  growth and development.  This is a welcome  may be essential  to expand investment,  considering
change  after a decade  and a half during which  capital market imperfections  and liquidity  constraints on
macroeconomics  was dominated by a concern  with short-  firms and households  in many devcloping  economies.
term adjustment  and stabilization  issues  - and basic  Four policy  conclusions  cmerge:
problems  of growth, capital accumulation,  and the  *  Public saving  does not crowd out private saving  one-
generation of savings  were largely  ignored.  to-one, so increasing  public saving  is an effective  direct
Schmidt-Hebbel,  Serven, and Solimano  draw three  way to raise nationa saving
general lessons  from recent literature on saving,  *  Foreign saving  should be allowed and encouraged  to
investmnent,  and growth:  support domestic investment-even  if it also helps
Despite  empirical  evidence about virtuous circles  of  finance consumption  - as long  as the macroeconomic
heavy saving  and investment and rapid growth, the  and regulatory framework  is adequate.
relationship  between  the three is complex,  with causality  Higher private  saving  should not be expected in
running in several directions.  response to the liberalization  of interest ates. Market-
* Still,  saving  often seems  to follow, rather than  determined interest rates will improve financial
precede, investment  and growth, contrary to the Mill-  internediation, the quality  of portfolio choices,  and the
Marshall-Solow  interpretation  quality of investment  - but not necessarily  the volume
- Investment  and innovation are the centerpieces  of  of savings.  Pension reform may be a better way to
growth. In this regard, the new literature on growth  mobilize  domestic  resources.
represents  a decided (if unintended) return to the  * Potentially  large externalities  associated  with
tradition initiated  by Marx, Schumpeter,  and Keynes.  investment  would seem to suggest  the need for an
Saving  may not be the chief driving force behind  "activistf investment  policy. But a better way to promotc
growth, but ensuring an adequatc savings  level must  investment  and growth is a supportive policy and
remain a central  policy concern - to ensure enough  institutional  environment, ensuring  macroeconomic
financing  for capital accumulation  and to prevent  stability, social consensus,  and a low cost of doing
inflationary  pressures or balance of payments  business.
This paper - a product of tne Macroeconomics  and Growth Division,  Policy  Research  Department-was  presented at
the Economic  Growth and Long-Term  Development  conference,  held in El Escorial,  Spain,  July 11-13,1994.  Copies of
this paperareavailable  free  from theWorld Bank,  1818 HStreetNW, Washington,  DC 20433. PleasecontactEmily  Khine,
room N1-061,  extension 37471 (48 pages).  November 1994-
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discussions.1.  INTRODUCTION
The 1990s have seen a resurgence of interest in themes of economic growth and development.
This is certainly a welcome change from the last decade and a half, during which macroeconomics  was
dominated  by a concern-  with short-term adjustment  and stabilization  issues, leaving largely aside the basic
problems of growth, capital accumulation  and saving generation.
Material progress and improving living standards require sustained output expansion.  Even
though questions of capital formation, technical progress and supportive saving have been at the core of
economic  analysis  for two or three centuries, their links are far from being clearly understood still today.
Causes and effects among them are not unambiguous and several factors can start and support growth.
The transformation  of an initial growth spurt into a sustained  process of output expansion and prosperity
requires accumulation  of capital and its corresponding financing.  This sets in motion a self-reinforcing
process in which perceived prosperity invites investmnent,  actual investment  supports growth, and saving
flows are generated along the way as income rises.
These links, however, can be weak.  As the Latin American experience of the 1980s has shown
the resumption of investment and growth after a period of adjustment and depressed economic activity
is far from automatic.  Coordination  failures, pervasive uncertainties and irreversibilities in investrent,
all make the recovery of growth a complex process.  Moreover, the ability of governments tD boost
saving is often limited, and scarce foreign financing can pose a binding constraint.  Booms are not
problem-free either, as they often generate unsustainable  growth trajectories that lead to busts.  These
transitional  problems are analytically  exciting but constitute  a nightmare for policy-makers. The bliss of
steady growth still remains elusive.  Historically, sustained growth paths have lasted at best a few
decades, as in East Asia since the 1960s.  By contrast, the high growth enjoyed-  by Brazil and Mexico
between 1940 and 1980 has been followed by persistently sluggish growth thereafter.
This paper provides a policy-oriented  overview  of recent dteoretical  and empirical work on saving
and physical investment and their relationship with growth.  Because  the research and policy agenda in2
these areas is quite broad,  the paper focuses only on  major issues and broad shifts in perspective
highlighted  in the recent literature, leaving aside a number  of potentially interesting  topics. Nevertheless,
the discussion covers a variety of issues, such as the interaction between saving and investment, their
links with growth, the sensitivity of -saving to policy measures, or the implications of uncertainty and
instability  for capital accumulation  -and growth.  Needless to say, some of these questions  - such as the
complexities  of the link between-income  distribution and capital accumulation,  or the practical importance
of the extemalities associated with physical investment - are still far from being fully understood.
The paper is organized in seven sections.  First, it reviews recent world and regional trends in
saving, investment and growth (section 2).  The paper then re-examines the critical saving-investment-
growth links in the light of the recent theoretical  and empirical literaure  (section  3).  Next, the discussion
turns to the behavior of saving, focusing on the links to fiscal policy, foreign saving, and financial and
tax incentives  (section  4).  The paper then examines  the main features of investment  behavior highlighting
new developments  on the impact of irreversibility and uncertainty, political instability and institutional
factors, and the links between income distribution, profitability and investment (section 5).  Next, the
discussion turns to the saving and investment  response to the different phases of adjustment and refonra
programs (section 6).  Finally, the paper's  concluding section turns to the issue of appropriate policy
interventions  to foster accumulation  and growth (section 7).
2.  FACTS AND PUZZLES: LONG-TERM REGIONAL TRENDS
Saving, investment,  and growth have shown in most world regions a 30-year downward  trend that
is both puzzling and worrisome (see Table 1).  World saving and investment rates have declined by
Xhe  data source for Tablel  is the World Bank's BESD  datbase,  which in tnm is based an  national
accounts  data published  by country  sources  or by the  IMP's International  Financial  Statistics. Regional  means  for
each  period  are unweighted  averages  of country  means  for the  corresponding  piod.  Regional  standarrl  deviations
for  1965-92  are unweighted  averages  of country  standard  deviations  for 1965-92  (or the available  period,  if shorter
).  Note  that the  regional  avcnges of sbndard deviations  reflect  the average  instability  over  time that  countries  fiac3
some 3 percentage points of GDP during 1982-92 in comparison to 1974481. Annual per-capita world
GDP growth shows a marked long-run decline from 2.7% in 1965-73  to 2.0% in 1974-81  and to a bare
0.5% in 1982-92.2
These negative trends  are more  marked in  LDCs than in  OECD  countries.  And  among
developing regions, large disparities in performance are observed, with Africa and East Asian providing
the two extreme cases of regional divergence. While in Africa  gross national saving rates were more than
halved between 1965-73  and 1982-92  - falling to a record low 3% of GNP in 1990-92  - the East-Asian
tigers' national  saving rates rose from 20% of GNP to 32% during the same period - actually reaching
35% in 1990-92. With massive increases in foreign saving inflows (from 6.7% of GNP in 1965-73 to
15% in 1982-92),  Africa's investment  performance  did not suffer much despite the reduction in national
saving; while lower than in the 1970s,  Africa's recent investment  rates exceed those achieved in 1965-73.
The opposite trend in the contribution  of foreign saving to financing domestic investment  is observed in
the group of East Asian tigers, where foreign saving has declined to a tiny 1.5% in 1982-92-  This,
however, does not make East Asia's investment  performance any less impressive  than its saving record:
at 33% of GDP in 1982-92  (and 36% in 1990-92),  East Asia's investment  rate exceeds by 12 percentage
points of GDP the rates prevalent in both OECD countries and bther LDCs.  It is not coincidental  that
East-Asia's 1982-92  per capita GDP growth, at 4.8% per year, -is  ten times as high as the world's average
in any given region  - and not the regional dispesion  oF countr  performance indicators.  Sample sizes vary
slightly by variables and yetrs  within the 1965-1990  span, with the, world sample varying between 99 and 104
countries, and declining  more strongly for 1991 and 1992 (when the world sample includes  only between 87 and
102 countries).  The main regions considered here are Sub-Saharan Africa. (Africa), Iatin  America and  the
Caribbean (LAC), six East-Asian Countries (the 'tigei,  comprised by Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia,
Singapore, and Thailand), Other Developing  Countries  (Middle-Eastem  and other Asian countries), All LDCs, and
OECD countries.  Former socialist countries are excluded from the sample.
2  One should be aware of the limitations of regional means and standard deviations: variable definitions and
data quality vary across countries, some countries are excluded fron  each region,  and the use of unweighted
averages - while useful  when treating  each country experience  as one distinct observation - is not representative
of individual country (and regional) economic  weights and  -is inconsistent  with world adding-up constraints (for
instance, that the world's foreign saving should be zero).4
of 0.5%.  At the other extreme, Africa experienced an average annual 0.4% decline in per capita GDP
during 1982-92.
Latin America and the Caribbean's (LAC) investment and growth performance is disturbingly
similar to Africa's  - both in magnitude and time pattern.  In contrast with Africa, however, LAC's
investment is financed to  a larger extent by national saving,  which results  in lower current account
deficits.
Another important  aspect of countries' performance is the stability of their saving, investment and
growth patterns.  The last column in Table 1 reports regional averages of country standard deviations for
1965-92, that reflect the instability that countries have faced in their performance indicators during the
last three deiades.
Instability is much more acute in LDCs than in OECD countries - standard deviations of the five
indicators are typically twice as large in the former than in the latter.  While these measures of instability
should be viewed with some caution,' their regional pattern does suggest that bad performance goes
together with high instability.  Africa is again the extreme case, with the largest standard deviations.
Higher instability in the poorer  and  worst-performiing  regions  may well reflect their  larger
exposure to adverse foreign shocks, the higher incidence of Various  domestic shocks (ranging from wars
to droughts), and their lower capability to cope with these shocks.  This inference is supported by annual
figures for regional performance (not presented here), that reveal the importance of worldwide shocks
for  decade-long performance trends.  Saving,  investment and growth  suffered in  all regions in  the
aftermath of the first (1973) and second (1980) oil shocks. But Esct Asia's performance suffered less and
recovered more quickly from the adverse oil shocks than most other oil-importing developing countries.
3 Note that the standard deviation is larger when time trends or step-wise structural breaks are present  - as
actually is the case in many variables.  Hence successful development  - as reflected  by uptrending saving,
investment and growth like in East Asia  - could raise our measure of instability. Nevertheless, we  prefer to
report straightforward standard deviations instead of standard deviations from time trends,  as the latter would be
based on necessarily arbitraiy  trend estimates.5
Table 1
World Saving, Investment,  and  Growth Rates  by Major  Regions and Sub-periods,  196S-1992
(Means and  Standard  Deviation)
1965-73  1974-81  1982-92  1965-1992  1965-92
Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean  St. Deviation
GROSS NATIONAL SAVING (% of GNP, including transfers)
AFRICA  10.7  8.3  4.8  7.7-  5.7
LAC  16.8  18.6  13.0  IS.8  6.0
EAST-ASIAN  TIGERS  19.6  27.5  32.4  26.9  6.6
OTHER LDCS  15.8  20.5  16.5  17.4  5.2
ALL LDCS  14.1  15.0  11.4  13.3  7.1
OECD  25.7  23.5  21.2  23.3  3.1
WORLD  16.6  -16.8  13.3  15.4  6.3
GROSS DOMESTIC INVESTMENT (C  of GDP)
AFRICA  16.9  21.8  19.2  19.2  6.2
LAC  20.3  23.5  19.3  20.3  4.8
EAST-ASIAN  TIGERS  22.8  30.4  32.6  28.8  6.2
aTHER LDCS  18.7  23.4  21.9  21.3  4.6
ALL LDCS  18.7  23.2  20.7  20.8  5.5
OECD  25.6  24.7  21.6  23.8  . 3.2
WORLD  20.2  23.5  20.9  21.4  5.0
CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE (% of GNP, including transfers)
AFRICA  6.7  14.4  - 15.2  12.3  9.3
LAC  4.2  5.6  7.9  6.  1  5.3
EAST-ASIAN  TIGERS  3.9  3.5  1.5  2.8  5.S
OTHER LDCS  2.7  3.1  5.8  4.0  5.8
ALL LDCS  5.0  8.9  10.3  8.2  7.3
OECD  -0.1  1.2  1.1  0.8  3.3
WORLD  3.9  7.3  8.3  6.6  6.4
GDP GROWTH RATE (5)
AFRICA  4.3  3.5  2.4  3.3  5.8
LAC  5.5  3.1  1.9  3.4  4.5
EAST-ASIAN  TIGERS  8.0  6.6  -6.2  6.9  3.3
OTHER LDCS  5.0  2.9  3.3  3.7  4.7
ALL LDCS  5.0  3.5  2.7  3.7  5.0
OECD  5.3  4.5  3.1  4.2  2.8
WORLD  5.1  3.7  2.8  3.8  4.6
PER CAPITA GDP GROWTH
AFRICA  1.2  1.1  -0.4  0.6  5.6
LAC  2.6  1.5  -0.7  1.1  4.6
EAST-ASIAN  TIGERS  5.2-  5.0  4.8  4.8  3.1
OTHER LDCS  3.7  3.3  1.1  2.7  4.8
ALLLDCS  2.4  2.0  0.2  1.5  5.0
OECD  --  4.0  2.2  1.7  2.8  2.9
WORLD  2.7  2.0  0.5  1.8  4.6
Source:  The World Bank (see fotnote  1).6
We  draw four  conclusions  from these  facts. First, all world  regions  - including  OECD  countries
but with the remarkable  exception  of East Asia - show a disturbing  downward  trend in their saving,
investment  and growth  performance  during  the last three decades. Second,  the regional  diversity  within
LDCs  is growing:  the  poorest  countries  and  regions  (Africa)  are getting  even  poorer while  middle.-income
countries  and regions (East Asia in particular)  grow richer.  Third, the poorer regions are not only
a¶fected  by bad performance  but also by much higher degrees  of instability. This suggests  that better
policies  and a mature  institutional  framework  - encountered  more often in East  Asia than in Africa  and
Latin America  - are paramount  to overcome  spells of bad luck more rapidly and effectively. And,
finally, the facts strongly  suggest the existence  of vicious  circles of low saving and investmnent  and
deteriorating  growth (e.g., Africa), along with virtuous  circles of vigorous  saving  and investment  and
rapid growth  (e.g., East Asia). The nature  of these links is the subject  of the next  section.
3.  SAVING, INVESTMEN  AND GROWER
The  traditional  wisdom  of development  theory since  at least World  War  IH  has been  that the long-
run rate of economic  growth is largely  dependent  on the saving rate: saving  determines  the financeable
rate  of capital accumulation, which  in turn  is the basic determinant of  long-run growth.'  Recent
theoretical  and empirical  research  has shed new light on, and also uncovered  some  puzzles, concerning
this mechanism.  Below  we draw  from this  work to examine  three key questions  that  refer to each of the
logical  building  blocks of the conventional  wisdom:  first, what is the relationship  (and, specifically,  the
direction  of causality)  between  growth  and saving  ? Second,  does countries'  national  saving  really get
4  This  notion rests on  what  is  termed the  'Marsha-Mill  view'  (adopted later by  Solow as well;  see
Chaklavarty  1993, chapter 3). For an alternative  interpretation  of post-World War EI  growth, see Marglin and Schor
(1990).7
translated into domestic investment  - or, more generally, what is the saving-investment  link ? And third,
what is the contribution of capital accumulation  to growth - most importantly, is investment  really the
key to growth ?
3.1 - Saving-growth causality: which way?
The conventional wisdom would seem to be supported by the long-term patterns of saving and
growth in developing countries described in the preceding section, which as noted earlier hint at the
existence  of a virtuous cycle between development  and saving - as well as low-saving and poverty traps
- across countries and over time.  Indeed, during the 1960s Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa had similar
average gross domestic saving  rates (12% of GDP); twenty years later Asian saving rates almost  doubled
to reach 22% of GDP and African rates were halved to 6% of GDP.  At the country level, Korean
household  saving rates started at levels  close to zero in the mid-1960s  and, after 20 years of high growth,
rose above 20% of household income.
The apparent policy implication  would be that raising domestic saving levels is of high priority
to ensure a sustainable path of high growth.  Yet recent research has shown that the relationship  between
private saving and income growth is a complex one.  It is important to distinguish two aspects of the
saving-income  link: first, the saving response  to income  fluctuations;  second, its response to trend income
or growth.
The saving-growth link over the cycle
Consider first income fluctuations.  Overwhelming evidence for industrial and less systematic
results for developing  countries show that both public and private saving are strongly pro-cyclical: most
fiscal policies are counter-cyclical  and private consumers tend to smooth consumption spending over the
business cycle.  If  households are forward-looking, not credit  constrained and temporary income8
fluctuations  do not change  permanent  income  much, consumption  would  respond only marginally  to
temporary  fluctuations.  But  households,  particularly  poorer  ones  in developing  countries  or those  below
a certain  threshold  income,  tend  to be credit-onstrained  and  therefore  respond  strongly  even  to temporary
income  shocks  (Deaton  1989a,b). Campbell  and  Deaton  (1989)  also argue  that a household's  perception
of its permanent  income  is strongly  affected  by current  shocks,  with  no evident  distinction  made  between
current  and  permanent  income  flows. Both  preceding  arguments  imply  that households  will  consume  out
of current  shocks,  saving  much  less than  predicted  by permanent-income  and life-cycle  theories,  giving
rise to what in the U.S. literature  is termed  'excess sensitivity  of consumption"  (Flavin  1981,  Hall  and
Mishkin  1982).  Few  empirical  studies  of developing  countries  have  looked  closely  at the effect  of income
fluctuations  on saving. Exceptions  are Gupta (1987)  and Schmidt-Hebbel,  Webb  and Corsetti  (1992),
which  find  that  saving  responds  significantly  and  positively  to temporary  income  shocks  but  by much  less
than  what  is predicted  by the permanent-income  hypothesis.
The longer term
Let us turn now to the relation  between  trend income  and private saving, which is the more
relevant  one  from the viewpoint  of long-term  growth. It is a bit ironic  that  while  the strong  correlation
between  saving and growth is a firmly  established  empirical  fact, researchers  have found it hard to
identifr  the precise  links between  saving  and growth.
Most  cross-country  empirical  studies  that  include  inwme  growth  as a determinant  of saving  report
a significant  positive  effect  of growth  rates on the saving  rate.  This result is obtained  for example  by
Modigliani  (1990) in a large study based on combined cross-country  time-series  data, performed
separately  for 21 OECD  countries  and 85 developing  economies.  Jappelli  and  Pagano  (1994)  for OECD
countries,  and Edwards  (1994)  for a samnple  of both OECD  and LDC economies,  confirm  this finding.
The same  result arises in cross-country  empirical  work for developing  economies  - such as those by9
Collins  (1991),  Fry (1978, 1980),  Giovannini  (1983, 1985),  Mason (1987, 1988),  Mason  et al. (1989),
and Schmidt-Hebbel,  Webb  and Corsetti  (1992).5
From the viewpoint  of textbook  consumption  theory, this poses a puzzle:  both the conventional
infinitely-lived,  representative-agent  model  and the overlapping-generations  model  (where  growth  takes
place  mostly  within  cohorts'  lifetimes)  would  predict  a negative  effect  of growth  on saving, as individuals
adjust  their present  consumption  upward in anticipation  of higher future income. The exception  could
be a life-cycle  overlapping-generations  framework  where  growth  takes  place  between  cohorts  (rather  than
within  each  cohort's  lifetime);  in such  conditions,  growth  increases  aggregate  saving  for the simple  reason
that income  of the active  cohorts (and hence their saving) is larger than income  (and dissaving)  of the
retired cohorts. However, Carroll  and Summers  (1991)  show  for three OECD  countries,  and Deaton
(1989b)  for LDCs,  that actual  age-consumption  profiles  are not consistent  with what is predicted  by life-
cycle  theories,  undermining  the empirical  importance  of this mechanism.
A number  of less-conventional  hypotheses  on consumer  behavior  have  been  advanced  to explain
the positive  saving-growth  link - but have scarcely  been tested (see Carroll and Weil 1993, for an
overview). One is concentration  of gr-owth  in households  with high saving  rates, such  as rich or middle-
aged  households  (Collins  1991)  --  but its empirical  relevance  appears  limited. A related, possibly  more
relevant  explanation  is that  growth  pushes  consumers  beyond  the threshold  level  of income  under  which
they are borrowing-constrained  or myopic. Slowly-changing  consumption  habits could  also contribute
to higher saving  rates in the face of rapid growth.  Combinations  of these approaches  may also help
explain the empirical  evidence;  Carroll and Weil (1993)  suggest a mixture of habit formatiob with
uncertain  incomes  (giving  rise to precautionary  saving)  as a promising  avenue  for further research. A
5 Interestingly,  Carroll  and  Well (1993)  show  that this may  be partly  due to the  outlying  observations  from fast-
growing, high-saving  East-Asian countries: when these  are omitted from their sample, the positive saving-growth
correlation  becomes  much  smaller  and insignificant.  However,  Carroll  and Weil's cross-country  sample  might  also
be biased  by the exclusion  of many  low-income  countries.10
final unconventional  hypothesis  is that  both  consumption  and  wealth  (or capital)  enter  the utility  function
- an idea advanced  in different  ways by "classical"  economists  (from Smith  and Marx to Keynes  and
Schumpeter,  see Zou 1993b)  and-which  is resurfacing  in some  very recent  literature  (Cole,  Mailath  and
Postlewaite  1992,  Fershtmnan  and Weiss 1993,  Zou 1993a, 1993b):  higher  growth  raises  wealth,  but -
due to wealth/consumption  substitutability  - increases consumption  -less than proportionately, thereby
raising  saving.
Of course, an alternative  explanation  would  just go back to the Marshall-Mill  tradition:  saving
is automatically  translated  into capital  ac-umulation  and thereby  income  growth,  and this is simply  the
mechanism  underlying  the  positive  correlation  between  saving  and  growth  observed  in practice.  Yet  some
empirical  evidence  that this may not be the whole  story is provided  by Carroll and We'l (1993),  who
argue that saving  typicallyfoglows  growth,  rather than  preceding  it.
From  the  growth  viewpoint,  the main  conclusion  is that  causality  between  saving  and  growth  runs
both ways. Thus, models  that fail to take such two-way  endogeneity  into  account  likely  overstate  the
contribution  of saving  to growth  - and this even  under  the maintained  hypothesis  that saving  is fully
translated  into investment..  We now  turn to this issue.
3.2 - The saving-investment relationship
Understanding  the saving-investment  link is important  for at least two reasons:  first, as just
argued,  it may  hold the key to the positive  correlation  between  saving  and growth. Second,  if capital
accumulation  is indeed the centerpiece  of the growth engine, the  interaction  between saving and
investment  is crucial  for assessing  the validity  of  the  traditional  recipe  that  raising  saving  is the surest  way
to increase growth -which  involves  the implicit-  assumption  that each country's extra saving.  is
necessarily  translated  into higher  domestic  investment.11
Textbook  macroeconomics  emphasizes  that the determinants  of saving are different  from those
of investment. The former depends mainly on income and wealth, whereas the latter depends  on
profitability  and risk.'  Being the result of two independent  decisions, saving and investment  can
obviously  differ ex-ante, as emphasized  by the Keynesian  tradition, in which discrepancies  between
planned  saving  and investment  are at the .earE  of macroeconomic  fluctuations  and growth  crises. Indeed,
Keyn,es'  well-known  'paradox of thrift" - according  to which  an ex-ante  increase  in saving  may  lead  via
multiplier  to an ex-postdecline  in real  output,  investment  and  saving  itself-  illustrates  thatpolicies  aimed
at raising  investment  and growth  by encouraging  saving might  actually  yield the opposite  result.
Nevertheless,  in the closed  economy  national  saving  and domestic  investment  must  be identically
equal  at least  in an ex-post  sense,  so that if saving  effectively  increases  investment  must rise as well. But
matters are more complicated  in the open economy,  as capital flows introduce  a distinction  between
national  saving  and  domestic  investment.  National  saving  need  not  be used to invest  domestically;  it can
also be devoted  to finance  investnent  abroad. Ideally,  in a world of unrestricted  capital  mobility,  each
country's  saving  would  flow  to the most productive  use in the world;  thus, an increase  in national  saving
would  be primarily  reflected  in an improvement  in the current account  balance, rather than in higher
domestic  investment  and growth.  And this mechaniism  seems all the more relevant in view of the
substantial  decline  in barriers  to international  capital  flows (especially  among  industrial  countries)  over
the last two decades.
This reasoning,  however,  is in direct  contradiction  with the empirical  evidence  first reported  by
Feldstein  and Horioka  (1980),  and recendy  updated  by Feldstein  and Bacchetta  (1991),  that in the long-
run saving  and investment  rates show  a strong  positive  correlation. On a sample  of industrial  countries,
Feldstein  and Horioka  find a correlation  coefficient  close  to 0.9 (virtually  the same fbund in Feldstein
6  This,  of course, was one of the fundanmtal contnbutions  of Keynes  (1936). In the classical,  pre-Keynes
tradition, there was no independent  investment function, and therefore investment  just followed saving passively.12
and Bacchetta's' update).  Other studies (Dooley, Frankel and Mathieson 1987; Summers 1988) find a
-similarly strong  correlation for  LDCs,  although somewhat lower  in  magnitude than  for  industrial
countries-
Low capital mobilit  or omitted factors?
*Whether'  this  result is evidence .of international capital immobility has  been the  subject of
considerable debate.  One view (defended by Feldstein and his associates) holds that international capital
mobility is indeed far from perfect, and therefore national saving increases crowd-in domestic investmnent
(albeit dtrugh  unspecified mechanisms).  The alternative view is that the observed saving-investment
correlation says little about international capital mobility 7 and is mostly due to policy reactions and/or
common factors that cause both saving and investment to move together in the longer term.
Along these lines, a wide variety of mechanisms have been proposed that could give rise to a
strong saving-investment correlation even in the  presence of high capital mobility (Obstfeld (1994)
provides an extensive review; see also Dornbusch (1991a) and Blecker (1994)).  For example, Frankel
(1993) argues that, even under perfect capital mobility, shifts in saving alter the real interest rate, which
in turn tends to move investment in the same direction as saving; however, this would imply that real
interest rates differ across countries even in the long run-  or, in other words, with uncovered interest
parity real exchange rates would have to display long-run trends.  A second explanation underscores the
'  The validity of saving-investment  correlations as a  measure of intemational capital mobility has been
-extensively  discussed  by Frankel  (1992, 1993),  who examines  ree alternative  measures:  covered  interest  parity,
uncovered interest  parity, and real interest rate equalization. Frankel (1992) argues that the first of these is the most
adequate,  as it compensates  for courtty risk he reports  a significant  decline  (nearly  a complete  disapp  )  in
covered  interest differentials among industrial countries in the 1980s, which implies that capital mobility increased
steadily over the same period.  In turn, Montiel (1993) provides a comprehensive  analysis of capital mobility in
LDCs.  More generally, the finding reported in the text that saving-investment correlations are typically  lower for
'suples  of LDCs than for industrial countries - in spite of the extensive capital controls and external borrowing
ntras  in many developing  economies  during the 19  70s and 1980s-  raises strong  suspicions about their validity
as measures of capital mobility.13
role of slowly-changing  demographic  and technological  factors  affecting  both saving  and investment  in
the same  direction  (Obstfeld  1986,  Tesar 1991). A third  alternative  attributes  the saving-investment  link
to the operation  of the economy's  long-run  budget  constraint  (Obstfeld,  1986):  in the long-mn, if the
economy  is close  to a stationary  foreignrasset/GDP  ratio, it is possible  to show  that  saving  and  investment
ratios  cannot  show  much  divergence.
An alternative  view shifts the focus from internaional to domesic capital immobility,  by
underscoring  the close  link  between  corporate  investment  (which  in industrial  countries  accounts  for the
bulk of private investment)  and retained earnings  empirically  found in most OECD economies  (and
highlighted  by Feldstein  and Horioka  themselves). Indeed, in industrial  countries  retained  earnings
typically  represent  the major source  of corporate  investment  financing;  the strong  correlation  between
both variables  (documented  by Murphy  (1984)  fbr U.S. firms, and by Blecker  (1994)  for a sample  of
OECD countries)  could be the key to the aggregate  saving-investmaent  correlation.'  This type of
mechanism  seems  particularly  relevant  for LDCs, in which  capital  market  imperfections  are widespread
and  borrowing  constraints  are the norm,  not  only  for organized  corporations  but  especially  for households
and  firms  in the informal  sector, which  in many  developing  economies  account  for the majority  of private
investnent.
Finally,  another  leading  explanation  (first  proposed  by Summers  1988)  is based  on the existence
of restrictions  on countries'  current account  imbalances,  due either to lending  constraints  imposed  by
world capital  markets  on deficit  countries,  or to systematic  (and successful)  current  account  tgeting  by
policy-makers. In both cases, the result would  be a strong ex-post correlation  between  saving 3nd
investment.  In particular,  under  the extreme  situation  of a perfectly  inelastic  supply  of fioeign  borrowing
However,  as Obstfeld  (1994)  notes,  this requires  not only  that fims finance  their  investment  with coprae
earnings,  but also that households  fail  to pirce  the -"corponte  veil,  thus ailing  to offset  a rise in firm.' sving
with a decline  in household  saving,  and thareby  allowing  a rise  in corporate  investment  to be matched  with  a rime
m aggregate  saving.14
-as  faced by many LDCs during the 1980s  --  national saving and domestic investment  would be highly
Cindeed  perfectly) correlated.  Moreover, in such conditions  the supply of foreign saving would play a
causal role in affecting domestic saving and investment  - in stark contrast with the textbook-case of
perfect capital mobility in which foreign saving is determined residually by the excess of domestic
investment over  national saving, and any extra gross capital inflows are completely offset by gross
outflows. Along these  lines, Argimon and Roldan (1994) find empirically  that in EC countries enfbrcing
capital controls (presumably  to target the external balance), saving and investment  display virtually unit
correlation, and causality runs from the former to the latter.
To sum up the discussion, the saving-investment  puzzle remains far from resolved.  From the
policy viewpoint, the key conclusion is perhaps that underlined by  Dombusch (1991a): unless the
empirical saving-investment  link is better understood, its existence  does not justify any strong inferences
about the investment  and growth response to saving policies.
3.3 - The investment-growth link
Growth and development  theory have long regarded the accumulation  of physical capital as the
engine of growth. Indeed, the notion that raising the investment  rate is key to increasing long-run  growth
has been at the heart of growth thinking since the times of David Ricardo.
The strong association  between investment  ratios and long-term growth performance is a well-
established  empirical fact (see e.g. Kuznets, 1973). Indeed, most counitry  experiences  of sustained  growth
tend to stress the link between capital accumulation  and GDP growth.  The case of East Asia, the most
successful regional experience in tenms of rapid and sustained  growth of the last three decades, provides
a good example- As documented  in the preceding section, the East-Asian  economies have been able to
maintain rates of GDP expansion  on the order of 7 to 8 percent per year, supported by rates of capital15
formation  around  30 percent  of GDP. Clearly,  high growth  and high investment  shares  have  gone hand-
in-hand.
However,  the key-role  of investment  in the  growth  process  was  challenged  in the 1960s  and 1970s
by neoclassical  growth  theorists. In the neoclassical  model  (Solow, 1956),  capital  accumulation  affects
growth  only during  the transition  to the steady  state; by  contrast,  long-run  growth  is determined  only by
population  growth  and the rate of technical  change,  which  was assumed  exogenous.  This view  attracted
considerable  criticism  from a number  of authors  (e.g., Kaldor 1957,  Robinson  1962)  on the grounds  that
the separation  between  investment  and innovation  (or technical  change)  was artificial,  as most  technical
innovation  tends  to be embodied  in new machinery  and  equipment. 9 Growth-accounting  exercises  based
on the neoclassical  model  (Solow  1957;  Denison 1962, 1967)  appeared  to confirm  that cross-country
differences  in investment  ratios could explain  only a limited  portion  of the differences  in per capita
growth performance  over long periods, suggesting  a crucial role for technological  change (or, more
honesdy,  unidentified  residual  factors)  as a major  source  of long-run  growth.
The arithmetic  of the Solow  model,  however,  does not square well with the strong correlation
between  investment  ratios and growth performance  observed  in practice  (see Romer, .1987). Recent
research  addressing  this issue  has brought  capital  accumulation  back  to center  stage  of the growth  process,
suggesting  an enhanced  - albeit more indirect - role for investment  as a key growth determinant.  One
line  of research  focuses  on the complementarities  between  investment  in physical  and  human  capital:  new
and technologically  advanced  machines  and equipment  need  to be operated  by workers with adequate
skills and education. Likewise,  the identification  and design  of profitable  and innovative  investmente
projects  requires  also the existence  of an entrepreneurial  class  with innovative  skills and awareness  of
business  opportunities.  Along  these  lines, Mankiw,  Romer  and Well (1992)  extend  the Solow  model  to
-See  alss Schumpeter,  1934,  who  emphasized  the fact  that  most innovations  were embedded  in the production
of new capital  goods  and business  pmctices.t16
include human  capital  and, under the assumption  that its accumulation  is guided  by that of physical
capital,  find that investment  performance  can account  directly  and indirectly  Ci.e.,  through  the parallel
accumulation  of human  capital)  for the bulk of the variation  in growth  performance  across  countries.
A second  line of research,  that has featured  prominently  in the "new" growth literature  (e.g.,
Romer  1986,  1987,  among  many  others)  emphasizes  the close  links  between  the accumulation  of physical
capital and technological  change  (a point that had been underscored  already  by Allyn  Young  back in
1928, and also by Kaldor  -1957  and Arrow 1962). If productivity  growth is endogenous  rather than
exogenous,  and related  to the accumulation  of physical  (or human)  capital,  then an increase  in the rate
of investment  again  raises the rate of growth  in the steady  state.
The strong  correlation  between  technical  progress  and investment  (or the capital  stock)  has been
amply  documented. Baumol  el. at. (1989), for example, show that in industrial  countries  technical
change  is highly correlated  with capital/labor  ratios.  De,  Long and Summers  (1993) estimate  panel
regressions  of total factor productivity  growth (1FP) for a  large sample of developing  countries.
Consistently,  their results show a positive  and statistically  significant  correlation  between  the ratio of
equipment  investment  to GDP and total factor  productivity  growth;  they also find a negative  coefficient
for structures  investment  in the regressions.
If technical  progress  is driven  by investment,  then  capital  accumulation  by any one firm benefits
other  firms in the economy,  creating  an externality  that  opens a gap between  private  and social returns
to investment.  In fact, De Long  and Summers  (1993)  calculate  a net social  rate of return  on equipment
investment  that is about 35 percent  per year: 10 percent  is the privately-appropriated  return on capital
and 20 percent corresponds  to the external effects.  induced by the correlation between equipment
investment  and TFP growth. These  figures,  as the authors  recognize,  are probably  on the high side.  but
still provide an order of magnitude  of the possible  divergence  between  private and social rturns  to17
investment.  Earlier  work  by Romer  (1987)  likewise  estimated  that  the social  marginal  product  of capital
could be over twice as high as the private  marginal  return.
From  correlation to causality
The strong  investinent-growth  correlation  referred  to above  has been  extensively  corroborated  by
a number  of econometric  studies. Levine  and Renelt  (1992)  conducted  extensive  tests on the robustess
of alternative  specifications  of the growth  process. In particular,  they looked  for the specification  least
sensitive  to changes  in additional  explanatory  variables,  the sample  of countries  and the choice  of time
periods. Their main result is that the only robust  regressor  in the different  growth  equations  - both
across  countries  and over time - is the ratio of physical  investment  to GDP. Other variables,  such as
indices  of external  openness  and price distortions,  and indicators  of fiscal and monetary  policy  stance,
all are ultimately  fragile as regressors.  Moreover,  this general result also holds in other empirical
'analyses  of growth  conducted  for Latin  America  and East  Asia. t -
DeLong  andSummers(1991,  1993)haveadvancedonestep  furtherbydisaggregatinginvestment
into its structures  and equipment  components. They present abundant  empirical evidence,  for both
developing  and  developed  economies,  of a crucial  nexus  between  investment  in machinery  and  equipment
and the rate of GDP growth. Estimating  panel  growth  regressions  for a sample  of 88 non-oil  exporting
countries  for the period 1960485,  DeLong  and Summers  found  a much  higher contribution  of machinery
and equipment  investment  than structures  investment  to GDP growth.  The result also holds for sub-
samples  arranged  according  to different  income  levels and continents.
A related  line of work is that of Easterly  and Rebelo  (1993), who  explore  the relationship  with
growth of different  types of public investment. They gathered  data on aggregate  and sectoral  public
'e  See  De Gregorio  (1992), Corbo  and Rojas (1993), Lefort and Solimano  (1993) for Latin America and Young
(1994)  for East Asia-18
investment  for nearly 100 countries. Subject to some reservations about the quality of their information,
the authors find that central govermment  investment  is positively correlated with both growth and private
investment,  while investment  by public enterprises (which presumably  competes more closely with private
investment  projects) is negatively correlated with growth.  Sectorally, they also find that the strongest
growth impact corresponds  to public investment  in infrastructure (transport and communications). These
findings agree well with analytical  and empirical results reported by Serven and Solimano (1993) on the
complementarity between  public  and  private  investment.  Public  investment in  ports,  roads,
telecommunications  and the like, provides the basic infrastructure needed for private investment  projects
to operate profitably; thus, such types of public projects are likely to have a maximum impact  on growth.
Empirical studies of private investment  for Latin America (Serven and Solimano, Chapter 7) and East
Asia (Chapter 8) show a positive and significant correlation between public and private investment.
While all these empirical  results underscore  potentially  important  aspects  of the investment-growth
link, in principle they say little about the direction of causation.  And, like with saving- it is necessary
to distinguish.between  the cycle and the long term.  In the short run, -investment  has been empirically
shown to depend on the rate of output growth and/or the rate of capacity utilization, as. indicators of
future demand pressure and/or the severity of liquidity constraints faced by firms - two key variables
in their decision to expand productive capacity.  Thus, over the business cycle investment  can be led by
output in an accelerator-like  fashion (see Serven and Solimano 1993, Chapter 2 for further discussion and
references).'"
In the long term, the traditional,  wisdom of development economics has long been that capital
accumulation is a fundamental cause of the growth process.  Recently, however, this view has been
It is worth noting that this sensitivity of investment to cyclical variations in output.  (or other short-term.
factors)  opens  the  possibility  that  short-term  recessions  could  have  long-term  effects,  by causing  a deep  investment
slump that leaves the economy permanently  trapped in a low-growth, low-investment  equilibrium.  In other words,
thegrowth process could be path-dependeat. SceeBruno  (1994)  for further discussion  and somecounty  experiences.19
challenged  by several authors  (e.g., Benhabib  and Jovanovic  1991, King  and Levine 1994)  who argue
that  the co-movement  of investment  ratios and growth  rates may  be largely  due to the action  of a third
factor  - technological  innovation  - driving  both  capital  accumulation  and  output  expansion. An  extreme
interpretation  of this  view  would  hold  that  capital  accumulation  is  just a consequence,  rather than  a cause,
of the growth  process. Along  these lines, empirical  evidence  recently  provided  by Blomstrom,  Lipsey
and Zejan  (1993)  using  a sample  of 100  countries  shows  that growth  Granger-causes  investment,  but not
conversely.
is investment  sufficient for growth?
While  the extreme  view  just described  seems  rather implausible,  the lesson  to be drawn  is that
the investment-growth  relationship  is more  complex  than  suggested  by the conventional  wisdom. Indeed,
the simplistic  (albeit  popular)  view  that  capital  accumulation  is the only  pre-requisite  for economic  growth
- a notion  labelled  'capital fiindamentalism"  by Yotopoulos  and Nugent  (1976)  - is untenable  as well.
As  the recent  literaturehas  emphasized,  other  complementary  inputs  (notably,  human  capital  and  technical
knowledge)  are also paramount  for growth.
But  even if these  other  inputs  are available,  the quality i.e., productivity)  of investment  is a key
determinant  of its ultimate  reward in terms of growth. Brute-force  capital accumulation  in mindless
pursuit  of scale  economies  in a framework  characterized  by severe  distortions  is unlikely  to have much
of a growth  payoff. Indeed,  under  extreme  distortions  massive  capital  accumulation  can  ultimately  result
in reduced  growth  when  measured  at  shadow  (i.e., distortion-free)  prices. Examples  of this situation  are
not difficult  to find among  countries  with heavily  regulated  investment  regimes  and/or  extensive  barriers
to market  forces;  an extreme  case is that of the former  Soviet  Union (see Easterly  and Fischer, 1994).
Thus, an incentive  framework  free of major distortions  can be instrumental  to realize  the full growth
potential of capital accumulation.20
However,  the  concldsion  that investment  may  not be the sole engine  of growth  does not alter the
fact  that  capital  accumulation  remains  a centerpiece  ofthat engine. In general,  it is hard  to find  countries
that  have  been  able  to grow at high and  sustained  rates  for long time periods  without  an important  effort
of capital formation - a fact noted long ago by economic historians  such as Rostow (1958) or
Gerschenkron  (1962). In fact, one of the main  merits  of the recent  literature  lies  perhaps  in the renewed
focus on technological  change  and  external  effects  associated  with  physical  investnent  as a major aspect
of the growth  engine  - filling  what Romer  (1993)  labels  the "idea  gap", as opposed  to the 'tobject  gap"
that can be filled  just by.  accumulation  of material  inputs. As noted earlier, this notion that technical
progress  is largely  embodied  in new  capital  goods  is  hardly  new  in growth  theory. From this perspective,
the recent  literature's  emphasis  on the major  role of productivity  gains  in long-tenn  growth  contributes
to enhance,  rather than  lessen,.  the importance  of capital  accumulation  for the growth  process.
Nevertheless,  it is important  to note  tat  the experience  of East  Asia over the last two decades
suggests.that  the'recent  literature's  emphasis  on "ideas' may have  been  overstated:  as Young  (1993)  has
convincingly  shown,  East  Asia's stellar  growth-performance  can be fully  explained  by its unusually  high
investnent ratios, and does not arise from any extraordinary  productivity  gains. 12 Indeed, Young
estimates.  that over the last two  decades  productivity  growth  in East  Asian countries  proceeded  at a rate
cdose  to.the world average.  This result is corroborated  by DeLong and Summers  (1993), in whose
framework  East Asia's rapid growth is likewise  unsurprising  given its rapid pace of investment  in
machinery and equipment.
32 It is importnt to recall,  however,  that  East  Asia's high rates  of physical  investment  were also accompanied
by an important  effort  at hunmncapital  formation.:21
4.  SAVING
Regardless  of whether  saving is the chief force driving  growth, ensuring adequate levels  of saving
remains a central policy concern in order to provide sufficient financing for investment and to avoid
balance-of-payments  disequilibria. Yet saving perhaps is the macroeconomic aggregate that is likely to
be the most elusive to both the economist's understanding and the policymaker's influence.  Whatever
saving definition is used,' 3 it shows massive dispeLsion  throughout the world  and over time.  For
instance, it is puzzling why two similar experiences of stabilization  and reform in Latin America.  have
implied  such diverse saving response: in Chile gross domestic saving rates grew from 17.0% of GDP in
1974-87  to 27.0  % in 1988-93,  while in Mexico they declined  from 26.3% of GDP in 1980-87  to 20.2%
in 1988-92. For the U.S. many different explanations  are offered for its secular reduction in net national
saving rates from 8% in  1950-1979  to 4.5%  in the 1980s and to less than 2% sinue 1990, including
budget deficits, population ageing, and lower growth.
Having discussed the relations between saving and  growth above, we  fos  next on  tiree
unresolved questions on the behavior of saving that are important  for both research and policy design in
developing countries.'  They refer to the influence of public saving on national saving, the influence
of foreign resource inflows on domestic saving, and the effectiveness  of financial and tax incentives in
raising private saving.
'3  Empiricil work on saving is haunted  by the low quality  of saving  data and the inadequacy  of saving
definitions.  Aggregate  saving  data  are often  reported  in national  accounts  statistics  as a residual  of another  residual:
consumption. Saving flows are typically  incozisistent  wit  changes  in wealth stocks beas  of incomplete
accounting,  under-reporting  of capital  income,  and exclusion  of capital  gains. Saving  does  not have  any  identifiable
deflator  related  to it, hence  making  it difficult  to construct  constant-price  time series. Finally,  researchers  often
fail to adequately  correct  raw saving  data, for instance,  for the infltion component  of nominal  interest  payments.
"  Some  of these  unresolved  puzzles  have  been  pointed  out by recent  surveys  of saving  behavior  in developing
countries, see Gersovitz  1988,  Deaton  1989b,  and Schmidt-Hebbel,  Webb  and Corsetti  1992.
"Issues  related  to the sectoral  disaggregation  of saving  and differences,  in sectoral  behavior  are considered
explicitly  by the fixst  and  second  quesfions.  We  will  not discuss,  however,  a further  disaggrgton  of privaxt  saving
among  households  and firms, although  some evidence  exists.  that-households  are not able to 'see through the
corporate  veil" (for instance,  Bosworth  1993  estimates  that  out of 9 OECD  countries,  thehousehold  saving  offset22
4.1 - How Effective  is Fiscal Policy in Raising  National Saving?
At a theoretical  level,  the two  dominant  paradigms  in modem  neoclassical  macroeconomics  offer
two strikingly  opposing  views on this issue. 14 According  to the life-cycle  overlapping-generations
model,  public  saving  affects  national  saving  (and  hence capital  formation  in a closed  economy)  because
it shifts resources  across  generations  that are only weakly  (or not at all) connected  to each other.  In
contrast,  the infinite-horizon  (or Ramsey)  model predicts  that when private  consumers  internalize  the
government's  intertemporal  budget  constraint,  changes  in public  saving  are exactly  offset  by changes  in
private  saving  because  of strong  intergenerational  linkages  (the  well-known  Ricardian  equivalence,  Barro
1974).
What  does  the evidence  show? Most  surveys  of the empirical  evidence  for OECD  countries  reject
Ricardian  equivalence  (Bernheim  1987, Hayashi  1985, Hubbard  and Judd 1986,  Leiderman  and Blejer
1988); the  notable exception is  Seater 1993 who concludes that Ricardian equivalence holds
approximately.  Recent  studies  for developing  countries  also  reject  the Ricardian  notion in its pure form
(Haque  and Montiel 1989, Corbo  and Schmidt-Hebbel  1991,'Easterly,  Rodrfguez  and Schmidt-Hebbel
1994),  but conclude  thiat  some  offsetting  of public  saving  by private  savers  occurs. -Empirical  rejection
of Ricardian  equivalence  could  imply  that real-world  consumption  is bound  by many features  assumed
away by Ricardian equivalence: weak intergenerational links, financial-market impections  Cmduding
borwowing  constraints),  consumer  myopia,  and precautionary  saving  under  uncertainty.
Hcwever,  the existing  estimates  of offset  coefficients  are few, too  different  from each  other, and
belong  to widely  differing  samples. Even when  using a common  methodology,  country  estimates  vary
widely. For example, Corbo  and Schmidt-Hebbel  (1991)  develop  a nested-hypothesis  framework  that
coefficient for corporate saving is (not) significantly  diffrent  fiom 1 in 6 (3) countries). However, there are vexy
few. saving studies for LDCs using household data, and only one using aggregate (national accounts) data for
*  households (Schmidt-Hebbel,  Webb and Corsetti 1992).
16  See for instance Azariadis (1993), Blanchard  and Fischer (1990). and Deaton (1992).23
distinguishes  between  Keynesian,  permanent-income  and Ricardian  consumption  hypotheses  and apply
it to a panel  data sample  of 13  developing  countries,  rejecting  each of these  tiree simple  hypotheses  in
their pure forms. In the overall  sample,  they  find a public-private  saving  offset  coefficient  of 0.47; this
result,  however,  conceals  a large  variation  in individual-country  offset  coefficients.  The same  is true for
Bosworth's  (1993)  results  for a panel  of 12 OECD  countries,  with  average  offset  coefficients  in the 0.24-
0.33 range  (depending  on the saving  definition),  but  with  a much  wider  range  of offset  coefficients  among
countries. Japelli  and Pagano  (1994)  report  offset  coefficients  for a panel of OECD  countries  that vary
hetween  0.38 and 0.48, and Edwards  (1994)  reports  offset  coefficients  for a sample  of OECD  and LDC
countries  that vary similarly  --  between  0.43 and 0.58 --  depending  on the regression  specification.
The implication  of the frequent  rejection  of Ricardian  equivalence  is chat  public  saving is an
effective  tool in raising national  saving, at least in the short to medium  term.  However,  just how
effective  fiscal  policy  is, is likely  to be much  disputed  until  more refined  measures  of offset  coefficients
are obtained.
4.2 - Do Foreign Resource  Inflows  crowd out Domestic  Saving?
While  in the above  discussion  on public  and private  saving decisions  causality  runs from the
former to the latter variable, foreign and national saving decisions  can affect each other in either
direction. As  noted in section  3.2, the higher is international  capital  mobility,  the larger is the degree
of endogeneity  of foreign  saving  to domestic  investment  and saving  decisions. What  does  the empirical
literature  say about  the influence  of foreign  resource  inflows  on domestic  saving  (and investment)?  We
will start by referring  to studies  looking  at the consequences  of overall  foreign saving,  to summarize
subsequently  some  results  on the effects  of foreign  aid. 17
17 Two analytically  essential  (but seldom  acknowledged)  points should  be addressed  by empirical studies. First,
a distinction should be made between non-connessional  foreign resource inflows (foreign investment plus non-
concessional  lending)  and foreign  aid (unilateral  transfers  plus the grant component  of concessional  lending). While24
With a non-econometric  analysis, Chenery and Strout (1966) found a negative initial effect of
capital inflows  on domestic saving, although second-round  effects on capacity growth tend to increase
saving.  Giovannini  (1983)  finds coefficients  on foreign saving for LDCs to have mixed signs and to be
insignificant  in domestic  saving regression equations. Fry (1978, 1980)  and Giovannini  (1985) find the
effect significant  and negative,  although  small. Schmidt-Hebbel  et at. (1992)  show a significant  negative
effect of foreign  saving on household  saving for a panel sample  of 10 developing  countries. Gupta (1987)
obtains the most extreme results: he reports crowding-in Cinstead  of out),  as reflected by positive
coefficients  on foreign  saving, which are significant  for Asia and Latin America but not for Asia.
Studies on the effects of foreign aid focus typically on how it is spent on consumption and
investrnent,  i.e., on empirical  estimates  of the marginal  propensities  to consume  (MPC) and invest (MPI)
of foreign aid transfers. The cross-country  literature on the relation  between foreign aid and saving (and
investment)  was started by Griffin (197-0,  1971), who found from OLS regressions fdr a cross-section
sample of LDCs a negative correlation between saving and aid, with an implied MPC of aid equal to
0.73.  Subsequent  studies by Weisskopf (1972), Papanek (1972, 1973), Chenery and Eckstein (1970),
Chenery and Syrquin (1975) generally  found far lower consumption  propensities, implying  that foreign
aid was more effective in financing investment.  However, much of this literature - like that on the
domestic saving effects of foreign resource inflows  - is haunted by severe biases stemming from data
measurement  error, mis-specification,  and simultaneity  (including  selectivity)  bias as well  as an inadequate
the former embody  an external fmancing  source, the latter implies  a wealth transfer. Second,  it is important  to deal
explicitly with resource fungibility  at  three different levels: external, domestic macroeconomic,  and domestic
microeconomic. External resource fungibility  refers to the degree of intemational  capital mobility. Perfect capital
mobility is equal to extreme external resource fingibility and implies complete endogeneity  of foreign resource
inflows.  Domestic  macroeconomic  resource fungibility  implies that external resources lead to higher spending -
in the absence of external resource fungibility - on both consumption  and investment  according to a domestic
rationing mechanism  (for instance interest rates) that is independent  of the programmed resource use.  Finally,
domestic microeconoumic  resource fuigibility implies that external resources lead to higher spending  - in the
absence of both  external and domestic  macroecononic resource  fungibility - on the broad spending  category they
are intended  for (for instance  on consumption  if intended  for food consumption),  but not necessrily  on the specific
project or sector they are targeted to.25
treatment of resource fungibility (see Papanek 1972, Levy 1987, White 1994, and Boone 1994 for
methodological  discussions).
More recently, Levy (1988) fbund a MPC from anticipated  foreign transfers equal to 0.4.  For
a  sample of  Sub-Saharan countries, the  Global Coalition for  Africa (1993) claims a  negative and
significant  effect of foreign aid on domestic saving. The World Bank reports a MPC of 0.4 and a MPI
of 0.6 for net transfers-  received  by Sub-Saharan  countries in the late 1980s  (World Bank, 1993b). The
most systematic  study available  to date (Boone 1994)  comes  to the opposite  conclusion,  drawn from panel
estimations  for 97 developing  countries. When the sample is restricted to the 82 countries  where aid is
less than 15%  of GNP -- that is, most LDCs -- all of aid is spent on consumption  while nothing  goes to
investment.'l However, when the full sample is used Cincluding  the 15 small SSA and island  economies
that receive aid equal to more  than 15%  of their GNP), Boone's estimated  full-sample  MPC drops to 0.45
and his MPI increases  from zero to 0.35, suggesting  thatthe lack of resource fungibility  is severe in small
and poor countries receiving  massive  aid financing  primarily investment  projects. His overall finding  of
a very high MPC in most other countries is consistent  with his model that postulates a world comprised
of heterogeneous  countries that do not converge in income levels.  In such a model the MPC of fbreign
aid is 1.0 - but no convergence  in income levels seems to be a rather stringent assumption. 1'
We draw three conclusions. First,. empirical estimates of saving effcts  of foreign aid (and
foreign  saving at large) vary widely  with samples, model specifications,  and empirical methods. Second,
the extent of extemal and domestic  resource  fungibility  is the key determinant  of the extent  to which non-
"  Boone (1994) reports that 93% of foreign aid is grants and that the portion of tied aid is quite small.
Emergency  and food aid represent only 5% and 13% of foreign aid, respectively;  over 40% is general balance  of
payments  support.
"Foreign aid could affect  saving  and investment  indirectly. For instance, private  investment  and growth could.
rise when foreign  aid conditionality  is successful  in promoting  policy  reforms  and a better allocation  of public
expenditure,  raising the productivity  of private investment. However, Boone's cross-country  growth regressions
show that foreign aid does not play a positive  role in most (82) developing  economies - but aid helps growth in
those 15 small LDCs where it exceeds 15% of GNP.26
concessional  external  resource  inflows  and  foreign  aid are channeled  to higher  domestic  consumption  and
investment.  Finally,  and most important,  very little is known  about  how  to measure  resource  fungibility
and  how  tn identify  its underlying  causes. Until  the latter  issue is resolved,  the relation  between  foreign
resource  inflows  and domestic  saving-will  be blurred.
4.3 - Do Financial  and Tax Incentives  raise  Private  Saving?
Governments  have attempted  to raise private saving through  many means, including  interest
liberalization,  direct tax incentives,  and capital  market reforms. Many of such attempts  have failed,
however  (Gersovitz  1988, Deaton  1989b),  and this raises questions  about  the responsiveness  of saving
to such  policies.
sb  Private  Saving  Sensitive  to the Real Interest  Rate and to Tax  Incentives?
- There are two ways  of looking  at this question. One  is by testing  for the  interest  effect  on saving
or consumption  levels.  Along  this traditional  line of research, country  and cross-country  studies for
OECD  countries  tend to show that saving is not much influenced  by interest  rates (see Deaton 1992,
section  2.2). Increasing  evidence  for developing  countries  (Giovannini  1983, 1985;  Corbo  and Schmidt-
Hebbel  1991;  Schmidt-Hebbel,  Webb  and Corsetti  1992)  suggests  that  private saving  (or consumption)
typically  does not respond  to the real interest  rate. Edwards  (1994)  confirms  the insensitivity  of private
saving  to the real interest  rate  for a cross-country  sample  of OECD  and  developing  economies. In those
exceptional  cases where a positive  response  of saving to the interest  rate is found (Gupta 1987, Fry
1988), it is quantitatively  very small.  There are many possible reasons for this finding.2? For
2'  One possibility is that the findings might be spurious due to severe aggregation problems assumed away by
the representative-agent  model. FollowingDeaton  (1992, pp.70), consideratwo-overlapping-generationslife-cycle
model  without  bequests, where consumption  at the individual  level of each generation is flat along the life horizon,
but where  life-time consumption of each  generation is  increased by  productivity growth.  Then agegate
consumption  will increase over time implying a biased estimate of the intertemporal elasticity  of substitution of the27
consumers  not facing  liquidity  constraints,  the substitution,  income  and human  wealth  effects  of an
interest rate rise roughly  neutralize  each other when the intertemporal  blasticity  of consumption
substitution  is close  to 1, as has been  found  by Schmidt-Hebbel  (1987)  and Arrau (1989)  for Southern
Cone  countries: Second,  liquidity-constrained  individuals  do not respond  much  to changes  in saving
incentives  - and  liquidity  constraints  have  a significant  and  positive  effect  on private  and  national  saving
rates  in both  OECD  and  developing  countries  (see  Jappelli  and Pagano  1994  for the former  and  Easterly,
Rodrfguez  and  Schmidt-Hebbel  1994  for the latter)- In addition,  there  could  be a non-monotonic  relation
between  saving  and interest  rates arising  from income  concentration  when  interest  rates increase. This
would  imply  that at low  and negative  real interest  rates, higher  rates raise saving  while  at high interest
rates  the saving  schedule  bends  backwards.  Evidence  for this  has been  provided  by Reynoso  (1988)  for
some  developing  countries.
A less conventional  way of looking  at this issue is 'by testing  how sensitive  the rate of
consumption  growth  is to the interest  rate, following  the Euler equation  approach. This is equivalent  to
testing  separately  for  the intertenporal  substitution  effect Evidence  reported  by Deaton  (1989b)  suggests
a weak  positive  substitution  effect  across  a large  number  of countries. Surprisingly,  econometric  studies
for the U.S. fail to find significant  positive  effects. For developing  countries  Giovannini  (1985)  finds
positive  substitution  effects  for 5 countries and no effects  in 13 countries.
If on average  private  saving were insensitive  to the (after-tax)  real interest  rate, three policy
implications would follow.  Fiscal stabilization,  if  it lowers the real interest rate, would not depress
private  saving  through  this channel. Financial  reform,  if it raises  the real interest  rate, would  not raise
the flow of private saving  through this channel,  although  it may affect significantly  the portfolio
composition  of the stock  of savings,  possibly  from flight capital  to domestically-held  financial  assets.
And  tax incentives  for saving  would  be ineffective  in raising  private  saving.
presumed  representative  agent as obtained  fiom the macro data28
On the latter  point  a sizable  literature  has focused  on the saving  effectiveness  of tax incentives
in OECD countries,  particularly  in the U.S., making use of cross-section  household  data typically
unavailable  in LDCs. The results  of the studies  for U.S. saving  incentive  plans  (such  as IRAS,  401(k)
plans  and other schemes  that offer tax deductions  on contributions  and accrual  of interest  but impose
limits  on annual  contributions  ancd  withdrawils)  are still inconclusive  on their effects  on overall  national
saving  (see Gersovitz  1988,  Deaton  1989a  for surveys). Among  the more recent  studies,  Engen,  Gale
and Scholz  (1994)  find that U.S. saving  incentive  plans  have  been  ineffective  in raising  national  saving
although  they may raise saving after two generations  as a result of income shifts toward future
generations.
Could Finandal and Capital-Market  Reforms raise Private Saving?
Financial  and  capital-market  reforms  have  potential  effects  on  private  saving  - other  than  through
changes  in real interest  rates-  through  various  channels  whose effects  are of different  signs. -First,
capital-market  reforns (and  macroeconomic  stabilization)  could  lead  to reverse  capital  flight,  raising  the
portfolio  share  of domestic  assets  and increasing  measured  income,  measured  net exports,  and measured
domestic  saving,  but without  affecting  overall  (correctly  measured)  private  saving  very much. Second,
financial  liberalization  and capital-market  deepening  could raise the efficiency of intermediation,
increasing  growth  and hence  (imdirectly)  private  saving  (Easterly  1993, King  and  Levine 1993). Third,
financial  liberalization  - and the consequent  increase  in geographical  density  of fiancial institutions,
range of financial instruments,  and quality of financial-sector  regulation and solvency-enhancing
supervision  - typically  leads  to financial  deepening,  reflected  in a permanent  increase  in the stocks  (and
a temporary.  increase  in the flows)  of financial  savings,  such as fnancial and banking-sector  liabilities.
Still, this increase  in financial  savings  could  simply  reflect a portfolio  shift without  affecting  overall
private  saving. Fourth,  financial  liberalization  typically  leads  to expanded  consumer  lending  and, more29
generally, less stringent constraints  on consumer  borrowing, affecting  private saving negatively. It has
been argued  that, on balance, financial  deepening  has contributed  to the growth in overall saving  observed
in East Asian economies  (World Bank 1993a).
Empirical studies have typically  proxied  financial deepening  by a measure of broad money  (e.g.,
M2); but broad money could be negatively  correlated with consumer borrowing constraints  (and hence
positively with  consumption), and  positively correlated  with  consumer wealth  (and  again  with
consumption  as well).  Hence its effect on saving is ambiguous  - and so are the empirical results for
cross-country samples.  For instance, while Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel  (1991) and Schmidt-Hebbet,
Webb, and Corsetti (1992) report negative  effects of broad money on saving in LDCs, Edwards (1994)
reports positive effects for OECD and developing economies.
Variables that reflect borrowing constraints more closely are reported to have less ambiguous
effects on  saving in  empirical cross-country saving studies.  Jappelli and Pagano (1994) found a
significant negative effect of loan-to-asset-value  ratios on net national saving in OECD countries and
Edwards (1994) found a negative  but insignificant  effect of consumer  credit on private saving in OECD
and developing  countries.
A final question  arises about  the potential effects on private and national  saving of one important
reform with significant  capital-market  labor-market and public-saving  implications:  the introduction  of
mandatory  pension  schemes  and pension refbrms  that substitute  pay-as-you-go  (PAYG)  systems by fiully-
funded (FF) schemes. While the overall evidence  on mandatory  pension systems is ambiguous  for the
U.S. and Japan, there is some evidence  that Singapore's  Central Provident  Fund boosted aggregate  saving
(World  Bank, 1993a)  and that govermnent  expenditure  on social security benefits  (typically  through state-
run PAYG  schemes)  has reduced private saving (Edwards 1994). Pension reforms that substitute  IT for
PAYG systems  could have long-term  static effects  on saving and the level of output and dynamic  effects
via capital-market  deepening  and higher growth. Simulationresults  for the U.S. (Auerbach  and Kotlikoff30
1987)  and for representative  LDCs (Arrau and Schmidt-Hebbel  1993, Valdds-Prieto  and Cifuentes 1993)
suggest that the long-term static effects are small.  However, dynamic effects through capital-market
deepening and growth could be significant, as suggested both by simulattons  based on a endogenous-
growth model as well as by regression results that explain the spectacular increase in private saving rates
attained  by Chile after financial market and pension reforms were adopted (Corsetti and Schmidt-Hebbel
1994).
5.  INVESTSM:  NEW DEVELOPMENTS
As noted above, the analysis of investment  decisions was pioneered by Keynes (1936), who
challenged  the then-prevalent  view of the inseparability  between saving and investment  decisions.  He
emphasized  the distinction  between  investors  and savers, and viewed investment  as a decision made under
highly  uncertain conditions  that required unavoidable  guesses  about  prospective future returns and capital
costs.
Since the 1960s investment theory has been in rapid evolution.'  We begin this section by
reviewing  some recent developments  in investment  analysis. We focus on three issues: the implications
of irreversibility and uncertainty for investment,  the links between  economic  and political instability  and
investment,  and the private investment  consequences  of ill-defined property rights and phenomena such
as corruption.
5.1  Uncertinty  and Irreversibility
Conventional  investrnent theory focused on different variants of the cost of capital (Jorgenson)
and the replacement-versus-market-value  of new capital goods (Tobin) as centerpieces of investment
decisions. These theories provided  useful insights about  the decision to invest  but failed to fully consider
21 See Serven  a;m Solimano (1993, Chapter 2) for a survey of investment  theories.31
three main features of investment  decisions:22  (i) the partial or  complete  irreversibility of most
investment  decisions  - once  the capital  stock  is installed  it cannot  be put  to a new  use without  incurring
a substantial  economic  cost; (ii) most investment  decisions  face inherent  uncentainty  regarding  future
benefits  and costs  - the best investors  can do is to attach  (subjective)  probabilities  to de  net returns  of
different  investnent  projects;  finally, (iii) investors  can control  the timing  of investment,  waiting  for
relevant  information  that  can reduce  the uncertainty  surrounding  investment.
These  crucial  features  have  led to a new  option  approach  that sees  an investment  opportunity  as
an option  to buy an asset  at different  points  in time,  balancing  the value of waiting  with  the opportunity
cost (m terms of foregone  returns)  of postponing  investment  decisions.'  Some  empirical  studies of
investment  both  at microeconomic  and  aggregate  levels  confirm  the importance  of the value  of waiting.2?
5.2 - Economic  and Political Crises  and Investment
Economic  and political  instability  is an important  field of application  of the option view of
investment. En  particular, political  and economic  crises  IR  large external shock, a financial  crash, a war,
exacerbated  social  and  political  conflict)  typically  create  considerable  uncertainty  about  variables  which
are key in the decision  to invest  The result can be a huge increase  in the value of waiting  far new
information  in order  to revise  the probabilities  attached  to the various  possible  events;  this is turn  causes
an investment  slump.
22 Se  Dixit and Pindyck,  1994,  chapter 1.
z  The option approach shows that the standard net present discounted  value rule of investment  (invest  when
the purchase and installation  cost equals the expected  return) must be modified. The correct rule  is that the value
of the new capital good must acted the purchase andtinsaton  cost, by an amount equal to the value of keeping
the investment  option  alive.
24  See partic6larly  chapter 4 in Serven  and Solimano  (1993).'32
Political instability  reflected  in rapid government  turnover  may also hamper investmnent,  if it leads
to an unstable incentive  and policy framework. An adverse investment  impact is especialiy  likely when
the political change involves  a re-definition  of the basic "rules'of the game" (investment  codes, property
rights, tax laws) and, in particular, when it raises expropriation  risks (e.g., Chile in the early 1970s,
Nicaragua in the 1980s).  Empirically, recent studies (e.g.,  Alesina and Perotti 1993, Mauro 1993)
confirm the important  role of political instability  as an investment  deterrent.,
5.3 - Property Rights and the Cost of Doing Business
There is no question  about the importance  of property  rights for investment. From the practical
viewpoint,  however, the formal definition  of property rights needs to be complemented  by other factors
guaranteeing their effective enforcement.  An important link in that enforcement are principal-agent
relationships,  that tend to be very complex. Monitoring  of agents (managers, workers) by the principal
(the  owner) often has to face imperfect  information  and is costly. The mrere  existence  of private propert
is no assurance  that the agents will act in the best interests of thie  owners, a feature that is partiuLariy-
relevant  for investment.
Related  to this is the issue of contract enforcement, whose effectiveness  can be jeopardized by
weak and inefficient  judiciary systems. Yet without  proper contract enforcement,  property rights would
be good only on paper.  In the end, the lack of impartial mechanisms to resolve contractual disputes
results in  an increased cost  of doing business, as the probability that contracts will be  respected
diminishes  and/or expenses  such as bribes become necessary.
This leads to the issue of corruption, wl-.ich  is critical for  investment projects because their
implementation  - particularly in highly regulated economies  - may involve many administrative  steps:
-getting  an investmnent  permit, obtaining  licenses  to import  critical inputs, gaining  access  to directed  credit,
assuring  compliance  with labor standards  and environmentl regulations, etc. The cost of doing business33
can rise substantially  if the typical  investor  is forced  to bribe  government  officials-in  order to complete
or speed up these administrative  steps.  In this regard, corruption  effectively  amounts  to a tax on
investment. Recent  cross-country  empirical  work by Knack and Keefer  (1994)  shows that higher
measures  of corruption,  just like weaker  property rights, tend to be associated  with a significantly
worsened  investment  performance.
The elimination  of unnecessary  regulation  can reduce  potential  sources  of rents for bureaucrats
and  thus  corruption. Civil  service  reform,  including  competitive-pay  polidies,  career  opportunities  and
moral  standards  is also an important  aspect  of institutional  reform  to boost  investment  and growth.
5.4 - Profits, Income  Distribution  and Capadty Utilization
A basic  insight  of Keynes  (1936)  is the dependence  of investment  on expected  profits  (relative
to the cost of capital). The rate of profit (profits  over capital),  can be expressed  as the product  of the
- - profit share (profits over output)  times the rate of capacity utilization  (output over capital). This brings
out  two  key determinants  of investment:  income  distribution  and  the level  of aggregate  demand  (or phase
of the business  cycle). Income  distribution  essentially  refers  to the shares  of capital,  labor and other
factors in  national income.  However, the relationship  between income distribution  and capital
accumulation  is a complex  one. On the one  hand, a distribution  of income  biased  towards  capital  can
increase  the profit  rate through  a higher  profit  share. On the other  hand, if aggregate  demand  depends
negatively  on the profit share - due to a higher propensity  to spend  for labor  than capital  - then a
redistribution  of income  towards  capital  will depress aggregate  demand,  lower the rate of capacity
utilization  and  depress  the profit  rate. In sum,  thepro  abilty  effect  can  operate  in an opposite  direction
to the demand  effect,  making  the reationship  between  income  distribution  and investnent  ambiguous.
Other  channels  might  be relevant  too for the relationship  between  accumulation  and  distribution.
Income  distribution  affects  the choice  of public  policies  and the degree  of social  and political  stability:34
an uneven income distribution may encourage workers' demands and labor militancy, increasing the
degree of political conflict.  An uneven income distribution might also compel governments to seek
populist policies of  rapid redistribution of  income that  can  be  fiscally  and  macroeconomically
destabilizing, as has been witnessed several times in Latin America during the last few decades (see
Dornbusch  and Edwards, 1991). Redistributive  policies in turn, may be financed through higher taxes
on capital thereby discouraging investment  and growth.  The  relationship between investment and
distribution is  filtered by political inistitutions,  and can be  stronger in  democracies than in  non-
democracies  (see Persson and Tabellini, 1992 and Alesina and Rodrik, 1992).  Empirical evidence for
a cross-section  of countries provided in Persson and Tabellini (1992) shows a positive and marginally
significant  correlation  between equality in income  distribution and the investrnent-to-GDP  ratio.
Stronger results are obtained in Alesina  and Rodrik (1992).  In cross-section  regressions using
the ratio of total physical  investment  over GDP as the dependent  variable  and controlling  for the type of
political  regime (democracies  versus non-democracies),  they  find a positive  correlation  between  the degree
of income equality and the investment  ratio.  A similar result arises when using average GDP growth
-rates  as the dependent variable, thus sugesting  that investment  is an important  channel through which
income  distribution affects GDP growth.
6.  ADJUSTMENT, REFORM, SAVING AND INVESTMENT
This section discusses the main linkages  between investment adjustment  and overall systemic
reform. Many adjustment  programs seek to correct an excess  of aggregate  spending over real output that
creates a deficit in the current account of the balance  of payments andlor inflationary  pressures.  From
simple national  accounts identities  the aggregate  excess spending signifies an excess of investnient  over
saving.  A cut in investment  spending  often takes place during the first phase of an adjustment  program
(see below).  This is an adverse trend if the investment  compression  lasts too long, as was .the  case of35
Latin America in the 1980s after the debt crisis.  In this case, productive capacities are impaired  and so
is the economy's ability to grow.. However, if the productivity  of investment  is low then some decline
in investment  will not be that harmful.
National saving also tends to follow a distinct pattern according to the different phases of an
adjustment  and reform program (of varying length, overlap and partial recurrence). To understand  the
interactions  between investment,  saving, adjustment  and reform it is useful -to separate.  between  the pre-
and post-reform  situations.
6.1 - The Pre-refonn Situation
There  is a  wide variety in initial conditions for reform.  Some countries might experience
instability  and large macro imbalances  such as high and erratic inflation, exchange rate volatility, fiscal
deficits and balance of payments disequilibria.  Examples abound, including Argentina, Brazil, Peru,
Poland, Russia in the late 1980s and the early 1990s.  In contrast, other countries have initiated their
reform programs from more stable macro conditions,? 5 but with pervasive microeconomic  distortions
and an oversized state?26
When instability is rampant before reform, private .investment  is hurt.  The key reason is that,
as noted earlier, instability and uncertainty invite a delay in investment  spending as most investment
outlays are irreversible.  Empirically, evidence  for five high inflation countries in Latin America from
1960 to 1990 shows that private investment  is negatively  correlated with the level (and sometimes the
variance) of inflation and with the variance  of the real exchange rate, two indicators of macroeconomic
instability.  Interestingly, when the same equations for private investment  are run for (low inflation)
- In these  economies,  the macro  disequilibria  (e.g., inflation)  can be repressed. In arn, fiscal  and balance
of payments deficits can be financed  by external aid granted for some specific geopolitical  reasons.
2  See Solimano, Sunkel  and Blejer (1994, Chapter 1) for a discussion  of inifial conditions  before reform in
a broad vanrety  of countries.36
OECD  economies,  investment  is negatively  correlated  also  with inflation  and measures  of exchange  rate
volatility (see Pindyck and Solimano, 1993).Y  These results dearly support the hypothesis  that
instability  is a powerful  deterrent  of private  investment.
Pre-reform  instability  can also  affect  public  investment,  in particular  if there is  a fiscal  crisis  that
forces  governments  to cut spending.  In general,  capital  expenditures  are  cut before  current  expenditures,
as the latter  cuts  often  create  less  political  resistance.  Of course  the costs  show  up in the future  through
lack of infrastructure  and other  productive  capacities.
In the case of highly distorted  but more 'stable" macroeconomics,  the problem is the low
productivity  of investment  rather  than  too  low a level  of capital  accumulation.  The problem  becomes  one
of "quality'  rather  than "quantity"  of investment.
6.2  - The Reform  Period
Let us turn now  to the situation  in which  reform  policies  are adopted. For analytical  purposes
we will identify  three different  phases  of reform  programs  that are relevant  in terms of their impact  on
investnent  and saving.
Phase 1. Adjustment  and Stabilization
In economies  with  large  macro  disequilibria,  the  firsttask of a reforming  government  is to restore-
basic  macro  balances  and  stabilize  inflation.  The typical  package  involves  a combination  of expenditure-
reducing  policies  (fiscal  and monetary  restraint)  along  with  expenditure-switching  policies  (depreciation
of the real exchange  rate).  These policies  are usually  supplemented  by the elimination  of various
subsidies  and by foreign  financing  coming  from multilateral  institutions.
The  relationship  between  investment  and inflation  is found  to be  non linear  in Pindyck  and Solizuo (1993).
Only  when  inflation  mates  exeed cerain  threshoids  a significant  drop in investment  takes  place;  moreover,  these
tdresholds  are much  higher  in Latin  America  than  in the OECD.37
Aucterity  measures  tend  to reduce  capita formation,  at  least  in the short  run, for several  reasons.
Fiscal  adjustment  often  involves  a cut  of public  investment,  currency  depreciation  makes imported  capital
goods  more expensive  and monetary  tightening  pushes  up real interest  rates depressing  private  capital
formation..'
On the saving  side, during  this first stage  fiscal adjustment  is also reflected  in higher public
saving. However,  the contractionary  effects  of restrictive  aggregate  demand  policies  typically  lead  to a
steep  decline  of private  saving,  as consumers  attempt  - as long  as they are not credit-constrained to
maintain  their  consumption  levels  during  the recessionary  phase. National  saving  often  falls  during  this
stage  - a result  of private  saving  cuts that exceed  the increases  in public  saving. Depending  on how
strong  the decline  of domestic  investment  is, the ex-ante  demand  for foreign  saving  - satisfied  ex-post
only in the absence  of a foreign  borrowing  constraint  - could  rise or fall during  this period.
Phase II. Intensirication  of structural reforms  and the Investment  Pause
A second  phase  in reform  programs  comes  after  the basic  macroeconomic  disequilibria  have  been
corrected. At this  stage  governments  can accelerate  te  structural  reforms  comprising  restructuring  and
liberalization.  Of course,  in practice  there might  be some  simultaneity  between  macro  stabilization  and
the structural  reforms  as the latter  will hardly  consolidate  if the macro  fundamentals  are not in place.
The response  of investment  in  this second  phases  is  mixed. In Chile  private  investment  responded
forcefully  to the launching  of reforms  in the second  half of the 1970s3' Likewise,  private  investment
has surged  in Argentina  and Peru in the early 1990s  after  toe launching  of liberalization  policies. By
contrast,  the response  of private  investnent  was  modest  in Israel, Mexico  and  Bolivia,  in the aftermath
- See Serven  and Solimano  (1993,  Chapter  2) for  a survey  of the  effects  of fiscal,  monetary  and exchange  rate
policies  on investment.
21 This response  was  reversed  in the crisis  of 1982483.38
of stabilization  during  the second  half of the 1980s. A substantial  deal of work has been  done on the so-
called  "investment  pause"  after adjustment."  The combination  of lack  of confidence  in the consolidation
of structural  reforms  and the fact  that investment  is irreversible  (in an economic  sense)  makes  investors
adopt  a "wait  and see" attitude  in the aftermath  of stabilization.
Public  investment  often  suffers  during  the adoption  of reform  policies. In part this is a byproduct
of fiscal adiustment;  however,  the decline  in public investment  also obeys a deeper structural  change.
In the new  development  strategy  that  follows  the adoption  of market-oriented  reform, a smaller  role for
the state is envisaged  both as producer  and provider  of basic infrastructure. The privatization  of state-
owned  enterprises  typically  leads  to a decline  in public  investment. Also, the opening  of new business
opportunities  to the private  sector in activities  that were  formerly  in the realm  of the public  sector  - like
power  generation,  roads,  ports -- leads  to a decline  in public investnent  in these activities. How does
private saving respond to these structural reforms? If cerin  reforms - such as trade opening  or
liberalization  of capital inflows  - are not fully credible, they may spur a consumption  boom  to take
advantage  of temporarily  cheap imported  goods. And  if they are credible  and lead to an expectation  of
higher permanent  income, consumers  may spend today in anticipation  of tomorrow's income gains.
Moreover,  trade  liberalization  frequently  allows  consumers  to adjust  their  holdings  of consumer  durables
toward  desired  levels  after  years of import  deprivation.  For all these reasons  liberalization  policies  lead
often to cn initial  decline  in private saving  that can be offset by an increase  in public  saving  as fiscal
adjustment  is deepened  in this phase.
Phase  m. Maturity  of Reforms and HRigh  Growth
The third  phase  of a reform  program  reflects  consolidation  of the measures  taken before. This
is a "happy  period"  as the fruits  of reform  start  to accrue in terms of higher  growth, enhanced  stability
s  See Dornbuch (199lb), SoGmano  (1992, 1993), Serven and Solimano (1993).39
and improvement  in living standards. Examples  of countries  in this stage would  be Chile in the late
1980s  and  early 1990s  and  the rapidly-growing  economies  of East  Asia. At this  stage toe main  problem
is not how  to get investment  and growth  underway,  but rather how to preserve  the dynamism  already
achieved. In this case, the sensible  thing would  be to maintain  the "fundamentals'  in place - low
inflation,  fiscal  balance,  external  sustainability,  adequate  price  signals,  social  stability  -- and  monitor  the
sectoral  composition  of investment.  In fact, during  more advanced  stages  of the development  process  it
becomes  crucial  to enhance  the economy's  infrastructure  and  support  the physical  investment  effort  with
the provision  of better education,  training  and other forms  of human  capital  accumulation.
On the saving  side, once  durable  stock  adjustment  is well-advanced  and real growth'  is rising,
private  consumption  tends  to grow  less  than income,  therefore  generating  a steady  rise in private  saving,
as exemplified  by the increase  in Korean  urban  household  saving  rates from 3% of household  income  in
1965-1970  to 23% in 1980-85  (Collins  1991)  and by the rise in the private  saving  rate in ChHe  from
1.0% of GDP in 1979-81  to 12% in 1982-89  and to 17% in 1990-92  (Corsetti  and Sclunidt-Hebbel,
1994).
7.  POLICY ISSUES  AND  FINAL REMARKS
We conclude  by summarizing  our discussion  of the saving-investment-growth  mechanism  and
deriving  some  policy  implications  for saving  and investment.
Three  general  lessons  can be drawn  from  the recent  theoretical  and  empirical  literature.  The first
one is that, in spite  of the virtuous  circles  of high saving  and investnent  and rapid growth  apparent  in
the empirical  facts,  the saving-investment-growth  relationship  is a complex  one, in which  causality  runs
in several  directions. The second  lesson  is that, nevertheless,  saving  seems  to be mostly  passive  and in
many  instances  it appears  to follow  - rather  than  precede  - investment  and  growth,  contrary  to the Mill-
Marshall-Solow  tradition. Finally, the third lesson is that investment  and innovation  remain the40
centerpieces  of the growth  process. In this regard, the new  growth  literature  represents  a decided  (albeit
perhaps  unintended)  return to the tradition  initiated  by Marx, Schumpeter  and Keynes.
Saving
Even if saving  is not the chief  driving  force behind  growth, ensuring  adequate  saving  levels still
remains a central  policy  concern in order to guarantee  sufficient  financing  for capital  accumulation  and
avoid an excess of investment  over saving that can create inflationary  pressures and/or balance-of-
payments  disequilibria. Moreover,  encouraging  private  saving  may  be essential  to expand  investment  in
a framework  of extensive  capital  market  imperfections  and liquidity  constraints  on firms  and households,
typical  of many  developing  economies.
From our discussion  of saving  determinants,  we derive  three policy  conclusions. First, since  the
evidence  shows  that public  saving does not crowd out private saving  one-to-one,  raising public saving
is an effective,  direct way, available  to policy makers  in order to raise nadonal saving.
Second,  as long as the domestic  macroeconomic  policy  framework  is sustainable,  the domestic
banking  sector is effectively  regulated  and supervised,  and  the govermnent  does not provide  guarantees
on foreign credit flows, foreign  saving inflows  should be allowed  and encouraged  to support domestic
investment  - even if they help in part to finance consumption.
Third, the empirical evidence indicates that one should not expect higher private saving in
response to  interest rate liberalization.  Market-determined  interest rates  will improve financial
intermediation,  the quality  of portfolio  choices (hence  avoiding  or reverting  capital  Right  and, possibly,
raising measured  saving flows) and the quality of investment,  but not necessarily  the total volume of
saving. Financial  deepening  (as reflected  by higher financial  savings  stocks)  has ambiguous  effects  on
saving  while  a relaxation  of constraints  on consumer  lending  tends  to depress  private saving. By contrast,
pension  reform can be much  more important  in mobilizing  domestic  resources.41
Investment
If investment  and innovation  are the key to growth,  an important  policy  question  is whether  an
activist  "investment  policy' is needed  to boost  growth  and, if so, which  form it should  take. In theory,
the need  for an activist  policy  could  be justified  by the existence  of investment  externalities,  as implied
by the positive  correlation  between  investment  and total factor productivity  growth.  To correct the
externality,  the conventional  policy  response  would  involve  subsidies  and/or tax exemptions  to capital
accumulation.  However,  although  this  type  of direct-interventionpolicy  might  theoretically  boostgrowth,
there are, in practice,  serious  limitations  to the administrative  and institutional  capacities  of government
agencies  to target  the "right" investments  and avoid  rent-seeking.
A perhaps  more effective  way to promote  investment,  innovation  and growth  is through  the
provision  of a supportive  policy and institutional  fameworlk  Such a framework  requires severn
ingredients:  macroeconomic  stability,  a relatively  distortion-free  relative  price  structure,  well-defined  (and
effectively  enforced)  property  rights, an environment  conducive  to  a low cost of doing  business,  and
adequate  political  institutions  that  foster  social  consensus  and  political  stability. To complement  all this,
the government  should  ensure  the provision  of adequate  trte  and human  capital  investment  -
be it in the form  of public  projects  or with private  sector  participation.42
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